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Journalist's Testimonial Privilege
Ramutis R. Semeta*
A strong society of free men must be kept fully informed. Liberty
can flourish only in the climate of truth. When Americans know
the truth, they are strong and free to act for the best interest
of the nation and the world.' -Dwight D. Eisenhower
Freedom of the PressO N NUMEROUS OCCASIONS, newsmen have pleaded for pro-
tection against testimonial compulsion as a necessary safe-
guard for the preservation of the freedom of the press.2 Due to
this constant assertion, one is compelled to take a brief look at
the press, before indulging in the specific study of the journalist's
testimonial privilege.
It must be admitted that the seed of the freedom of the press
was in the hearts of men long before it was planted in the minds
of English-speaking peoples by Lord Mansfield in 1784, when
he pronounced that "The liberty of the press consists in printing
without any previous license, subject to the consequence of law." 3
This liberty was a plant of slow growth in England, but in due
time it won unquestionable acceptance and support. By 1900,
Lord Russell had to reiterate the judicial position on this subject
by stating that "the liberty of the press is no greater and no less
than the liberty of every subject of the Queen." 4 The rationale
of the above decisions discloses the fact that the people of England
wanted not only a free but also an unprivileged and responsible
press.
The dangerous voyage and the treacherous waters of the At-
lantic failed to affect the genes of this seed, and it was grimly
planted on the shores of the newly discovered American conti-
nent by the people who left behind the experience of Star Cham-
ber techniques of censorship. With these experiences still vivid
in their minds, those forefathers of America thought that all they
* B.A., Western Reserve Univ.; a Senior at Cleveland-Marshall Law School.
1 This Week Magazine, Nov. 8, 1959, p. 2. These words were presented by
President Eisenhower as a prelude to this week's nationwide celebration of
the freedom of the press. The occasion was the fiftieth anniversary of Sigma
Delta Chi, professional journalistic fraternity.
2 Torre v. Gar]and, 259 F. 2d 545 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U. S.
910 (1958). The reporter claimed that compulsory disclosure of such infor-
mation would amount to a prior restraint upon publication and would
encroach upon the freedom of the press as guaranteed by the First Amendm.
of the Federal Const. See, Recent Decisions, 34 Notre Dame Lawyer 259
(1959).
3 R. v. Dean of St. Asaph, 3 T. R. 431n, 100 English Reports 657n, 661
(1784).
4 R. v. Gray, 2 Q. B. 36, 40 (1900).
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would have to do is "to leave the press free and everyone would
live in light." 5 Still, the original concepts pronounced in the
mother country were adopted and even today the general rule,
independent of statute, is that:
a newspaper has no more right than a private individual
has to trifle with the reputation of any citizen, or by care-
lessness or recklessness to injure his good name or business
without answering thereof in damages. Publishers of news-
papers have the right to publish the truth, but they have no
right to publish falsehood to the injury of others.6
The scope of this article forbids the piercing of the cobwebs
of history and the tracing of the development of the American
press. It is sufficient to observe that by the turn of the century,
the American press became completely transformed and re-cre-
ated. The evolution and transition from the personal organ to
the modern daily is attributable to a number of factors and cir-
cumstances, 7 such as the scientific and economic revolution, the
passing of the personal element in journalism, the material
growth of the nation, the growth of advertising, governmental
cooperation in low postal rates, and such processes as consolida-
tion, standardization, and capitalization, all of which completely
changed the nature of American journalism.
This rapid evolutionary process and ultimate emergence of
the modern press at first received very little judicial considera-
tion. A deep devotion by the American people to the liberty of
the press encouraged judicial insistence upon a broad and liberal
construction of the constitutional provision. Due to this climate,
not until the decision of Near v. Minnesota" was there any
serious challenge to the principle that there should be no pre-
vious restraint upon any publication. Today, however, this im-
munity is not absolute, and the courts and legislatures have im-
posed, in exceptional cases, some restrictions, which are basically
designed to serve three purposes: (1) To protect governments
and their processes; 9 (2) To protect individuals in good name,
business reputation and right of privacy;' 0 (3) To protect the
morals of the public and its right not to be defrauded or de-
5 Wells, The Outline of History 888 (1949).
6 17 R. C. L. 349. See cases collected in footnote therein.
7 2 Morison and Commager, The Growth of the American Republic 288-294
(4th ed. 1954).
8 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 51 Sup. Ct. 625 (1931).
9 Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47, 39 Sup. Ct. 247 (1919). The con-
cept of "clear and present danger" announced in this case received its most
recent interpretation in Dennis v. United States, 341 U. S. 494, 71 Sup. Ct. 91
(1951); Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252, 62 Sup. Ct. 190 (1941); Penne-
kamp v. Florida, 328 U. S. 331, 66 Sup. Ct. 1029 (1946); Craig v. Harney, 331
U. S. 367, 67 Sup. Ct. 1249 (1947).
10 Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77, 69 Sup. Ct. 448 (1949).
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ceived.11 At the same time, some of the protective laws concern-
ing the press and journalists began to appear on the horizon.
Privilege and Confidence Statutes
Recent history has witnessed the emergence of these pro-
tective laws, in the form of new privileges for secrecy of com-
munications, on the statute books of several legislatures.
Already sixty-five years have elapsed since the enactment
of the first confidence statute1 2 which extended to newsmen the
privilege to withhold the source of information obtained by them
in confidence. Today newsmen are protected by confidence
statutes in twelve states. 13 Seven of these states extended this
privilege to radio, 14 six to television,15 and four to press associa-
tions. "', Also, recently, attempts have been made to enact such
legislation in thirteen other jurisdictions. 17 This trend, if per-
mitted to continue, subsequently will extinguish the traditional
concept that the press and journalists should not be singled out
for special legal favors or restrictions.
Privilege, in law, is an immunity or exemption conferred by
special grant to an individual or a certain class in derogation of
common right.'8 Its presence is felt in the law of evidence.
Privilege, as it relates to the law of evidence, "concerns con-
fidential communications between persons holding confidential
relationships to each other, such as husband and wife, attorney
and client, and fellow jurors, plus privileges questioned at Com-
mon Law, of priest and penitent and physician and patient, and
11 Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 77 Sup. Ct. 1304 (1957).
12 State of Maryland enacted such a statute in 1896.
13 Ala. Code Ann. tit. 7, § 370 (1940); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12.2237 (1956);
Ark. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, § 917 (1947); Cal. Code Civ. Proc. Ann. § 1881(6)
(1946); Ind. Ann. Stat. § 2-1733 (Burns Supp. 1957); Ky. Rev. Stat.
§ 421.100 (1955); Md. Ann. Code Gen. Laws art. 35, § 2 (1957); Mich. Stat.
Ann. §28,945(1) (1954); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. §93.601-2 (Supp. 1957);
N. J. Stat. Ann. 2a: 81-10 (1952); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2739.12 (1953);
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 28, § 330 (1958).
The chronological order of adoption of these statutes is as follows:
Maryland 1896 Arizona 1937
New Jersey 1933 Pennsylvania 1937
Alabama 1935 Indiana 1941
California 1935 Ohio 1941
Arkansas 1936 Montana 1943
Kentucky 1936 Michigan 1949
14 Alabama, Arkansas, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Montana, Ohio (R. C.§ 2739.04, effective May 27, 1959).
15 Alabama, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Montana, Ohio (R. C. § 2739.04).
16 Indiana, Montana, Ohio (R. C. § 2739.12), Pennsylvania.
17 Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Kansas, Massachusetts, Missouri, New
Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, Texas, Virginia, Washington, and Wis-
consin.
18 Webster's New World Dictionary 1160 (1955).
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public policy requires that these confidences shall not, without
consent, be revealed to third parties at any time, in or out of
court." 19 The obvious effect of these privileges is that they shut
out probative evidence and thus hamper judicial search for truth.
Since the general policy of the law of evidence is to compel dis-
closure of all relevant information as an aid in the ascertainment
of truth and ultimately the due administration of law, privileged
communications are the exception to the general rule2 0 which
holds that "the public has a right to every man's evidence." 21
Wigmore 22 states that there are four recognized fundamental
conditions necessary to the establishment of a privilege against
disclosure of communications, and he enumerates them as follows:
1. The communications must originate in confidence that
they will not be disclosed.
2. The element of confidentiality must be essential to the
full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between
the parties.
3. The relation must be one which in the opinion of the
community ought to be fostered.
4. The injury that would inure to the relation by the dis-
closure of the communication must be greater than the
benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of the liti-
gation.23
The journalist's statutory privilege which protects him
against testimonial compulsion fails to satisfy these fundamental
conditions. The appearance of this statutory privilege is probably
due to a misconception which was promoted by invocation of a
false analogy to the existing privileges. These privileges extend-
ing the protection to physician-patient,24 lawyer-client, clergy-
man-penitent, and husband-wife 25 relations, have been justified
on public policy grounds, i.e., that the public good is better
served by encouraging the confidential relationship rather than
19 Lindner v. First Nat. Bank and Trust Co. of Montclair, 9 N. J. Super.
569, 76 A. 2d 49, 51 (1950); 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2197, at 106 (3rd ed. 1940).
20 People ex rel. Mooney v. Sheriff, 269 N. Y. 291, 199 N. E. 415, 416 (1936).
21 In re Investigation of World Arrangements with Relation to the Produc-
tion etc., 13 F. R. D. 280, 281 (D. C. D. C. 1952); United States v. Bryan,
339 U. S. 323, 331, 70 Sup. Ct. 724, 730 (1950).
22 8 Wigmore, Evidence, § 2286 (3rd ed. 1940).
23 In re Herrnstein, 6 Ohio Supp. 260, 20 Ohio 0. 405, 410 (1941). It is inter-
esting to note that this court, just a few months before the passage of the
confidence statute, stated that a privilege should not be recognized unless it
satisfies all these conditions.
24 Stewart, Physician-Patient Privilege in Ohio, 8 Clev.-Mar. L. R. 444
(1959).
25 Guarnieri, Husband-Wife Privileged Communications, Summarized, 8
Clev.-Mar. L. R. 531 (1959).
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by disclosing the facts.20 It is very doubtful, indeed, whether the
creation and preservation of a confidential relationship between
newsmen and their informants could be justified upon these
grounds. The New York Bar Association Committee on State
Legislation made the following observation on a journalist's
privilege:
The proposed new class of privileged communications does
not meet any of these four fundamental conditions. More-
over, the bills do not prevent the disclosure of the commu-
nications, which is the purpose of the present statutes, but
merely prevent the disclosure of the source of the informa-
tion. Their effect, as a matter of fact, is directly contrary to
the effect of the present statutes in that they encourage the
disclosure of the communication instead of preventing it.
They open the way to reckless publication and abuse, and
while on their face they seem to protect the editor and re-
porter, in reality they protect the informant. It seems to us
that the informant, who furnishes information to a reporter
for the express purpose of having it published, should have
no such immunity as these bills propose.2
7
At Common Law there was no recognition of this privilege,
and if a newsman was summoned before a court of competent
jurisdiction and was asked to disclose the source of information
which had come into his hands, such evidence being relevant and
material to the issue at trial, he could not claim exemption as a
witness from answering a question on the ground that he had
received the same under a promise that he would not divulge
the name of his informant.2s Therefore, generally, the mere fact
that a communication is made in express or implied confidence
does not create a privilege, because "No pledge of privacy, nor
oath of secrecy, can avail against a man for truth in a court of
justice." 29
The reasons given by the courts for the above stated rule
vary, but the one most frequently relied upon is "the superior
26 McCormick, Evidence § 90, at 179 (1954).
27 N. Y. City Association of the Bar, Committee on State Legislation (1930),
reprinted in 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2286, at 538 (3rd ed. 1940).
28 Leading cases: In re Grunov, 84 N. J. L. 235, 85 A. 1011 (1913); People
v. Durrant, 116 Cal. 179, 48 P. 75 (1897); Ex parte Lawrence and Levings,
116 Cal. 299, 48 P. 124 (1897); Joslyn v. People, 67 Colo. 297, 185 P. 375
(1919); Pledger v. State, 77 Ga. 242, 3 S. E. 320 (1886); Plunkett v. Hamil-
ton, 136 Ga. 72, 70 S. E. 781 (1911); People ex rel. Mooney v. Sheriff, 269
N. Y. 291, 199 N. E. 415 (1935); State v. Donovan, 129 N. J. L. 478, 30 A. 2d
421 (1943); Brogan v. Passaic Daily News, 22 N. J. 139, 123 A. 2d 473
(1956); Clinton v. Commercial Tribune Co., 11 Ohio Dec. 603 (1901). U. S.:
Brewster v. Boston Herald-Traveler Corp., 20 F. R. D. 416 (D. Mass. 1957);
Rosenberg v. Carrol, 99 F. Supp. 629 (So. D. N. Y. 1951) (dicta); Ex parte
Sparrow, 14 F. R. D. 351 (N. D. Ala. 1953). Also see 97 C. J. S. 743, and
annot., 102 A. L. R. 771 (1936).
29 People ex rel., supra note 20.
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interest of the public in the due administration of the law over
any private consideration that may exist as between journalists
and their informants." 30
Perhaps, this constant judicial denial of the privilege inspired
the newsmen in their search for greener pastures. As a result,
the newsmen embarked on a major campaign to woo the state
legislatures and, as we have seen, they were successful in a few
states.
Position of the Opponents
This legislative extension of the privilege of non-disclosure
to newspapermen created from the very beginning a controversy
which has not as yet subsided, but on the contrary its flames con-
tinue to glow as brightly as ever. In fact, it has been the subject
of considerable specific study and criticism: state3 ' and federal3 2
courts, textbook writers, 33 legal commentators,34 and govern-
mental commissions 35 consistently deplored this type of statute.
Many policy considerations have been stated in opposition to
this privilege, the foremost being that the practice of the courts
has been to limit rather than extend the classes to whom evi-
dentiary privilege is granted 1
A recent fifteen month study conducted by the American
Civil Liberties Union announced the belief that "the legislative
approach in this field is neither necessary nor at the present time
30 Annot., 102 A. L. R. 771, 772 (1936).
31 State v. Donovan, 129 N. J. L. 478, 30 A. 2d 421 (1943); Brogan v. Passaic
Daily News, 22 N. J. 139, 123 A. 2d 473 (1956).
32 Brewster v. Boston Herald-Traveler Corp., 20 F. R. D. 416 (D. Mass.
1957); Rosenberg v. Carrol, 99 F. Supp. 629 (So. D. N. Y. 1951) (dicta);
Ex parte Sparrow, 14 F. R. D. 351 (N. D. Ala. 1953).
33 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 22; 2 Conrad, Modern Trial Evidence 256
(1956); McCormick, Evidence § 81, at 166 (1954). The author expresses hope
that perhaps in the future the rule of privilege will take the path from rule
to discretion.
34 2 Chafee, Government and Mass Communications 496 (1947). The author
observed that "The trend of the best legal judgment is away from all occu-
pational privileges . . .;" Note, 36 Va. L. R. 61 (1950); Gallup, Further
Consideration of a Privilege for Newsman, 14 Albany L. R. 16 (1950).
35 New York Law Revision Commission, Report 1949, pp. 23-168. In 1937-
1938, this subject was placed on the program of the American Bar Associa-
tion Committee on the Improvement of the Law of Evidence. The commit-
tee recommended that the Legislatures refuse to create any new privileges
for secrecy of communications. This report is reprinted in 8 Wigmore, Evi-
dence § 2286, at 539 (3rd ed. 1940).
36 McCormick, op. cit. supra note 33, at 165, states that "The manifest
destiny of evidence law is a progressive lowering of the barriers to truth.
Seeing this tendency, the commentators who take a wide view, whether
from the bench, the bar, or the schools, seem generally to advocate a
narrowing of the field of privilege."
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desirable." 17 This indictment against legislative sanction of the
privilege seems to be well founded. Since the rule of privilege
prevents probative evidence from coming in, it obstructs the
judicial investigation of truth or falsity of facts in issue pre-
sented for the court's determination. Another reason given by
the opposition is the fact that newsmen are not screened as to
character nor licensed by any supervisory authority,3 8 and they
are not subject to as strict sanctions as other classes to whom ex-
isting privileges apply, and which tend to restrict abuses of
these privileges. The only restriction upon a journalist is the
limit of his own zeal or that of his employer. In the opinion of
Gallup:
The protection of an innocent person from slander and libel
by unscrupulous newsmen seems more compelling in the
public interest than the protection of equally unscrupulous
informants. 39
The scope and meaning of the present statutes cannot be de-
fined with accuracy, because only a few cases arising under them
received judicial interpretation. But the hostility of the courts
to this extension of the privilege can be detected from these de-
cisions.
In State v. Donovan,40 the court held that the statutory privi-
lege did not permit a correspondent to refuse to divulge the
physical means of transmitting the information from the source
to the newsman. The court justified this narrow construction on
the ground that this statute being in derogation of common law
must be strictly construed. Therefore, where the inquiry is not
as to the source but as to the means of acquiring the information,
the statutory privilege does not apply. Under this construction,
if information was delivered by a messenger, whom the newsman
must name, then the source can be easily ascertained by merely
putting the messenger on the stand and compelling him to di-
vulge the source.4 1
In Brogan v. Passaic Daily News, 4 2 a newspaper editor
pleaded "fair comment" and "good faith" as affirmative defenses
37 New York Times, March 18, 1959, p. 75. The report continued that
"Most of the proposed or enacted statutes seem dangerously loose (in their
definition); none of the statutes has yet been tested for constitutionality,
and their survival of such a test may be doubtful."
38 4 Negl. and Compens. Service, No. 14, p. 111 (Oleck, ed., Apr. 15, 1959);
Gallup, op. cit. supra note 34.
39 Gallup, op. cit. supra note 34.
40 129 N. J. L. 478, 30 A. 2d 421 (1943); In view of the holding in Weis v.
Weis, 147 Ohio St. 416, 72 N. E. 2d 245 (1947), the newsman's privilege
statute, if it ever comes before the Ohio courts, might be similarly con-
strued.
41 Steigleman, Newspaper Confidence Laws, 20 Journalism Quarterly 231-
232 (September, 1943). This decision is severely criticized as emasculating
the New Jersey privilege statute.
42 22 N. J. 139, 123 A. 2d 473 (1956).
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1960
9 CLEV-MAR. L. R. (2)
and further testified that the article was based upon "a reliable
source" and disclosed the information received from that source.
The court held that a newsman's privilege, like any other personal
privilege, constitutional or statutory, can be waived and is so
waived by voluntary testimony of the person upon whom the
privilege is conferred. The court continued that "If a newspaper
may libel, and then defend stating that the information came
from a 'reliable source,' and then bar further inquiry into the
source by pleading the statutory privilege, recovery would be
denied in most cases if not all. 43 . . . We agree that this would
amount to using the statute as a sword rather than as a shield as
was intended when the statute was enacted." 44
The above decisions fairly suggest that in the future, the
strict construction of confidence statutes by the courts can be
anticipated.
In the recent case of Torre v. Garland,45 the reporter claimed
that compulsory disclosure of the "source" would encroach upon
the freedom of the press as guaranteed by the First Amendment
of the Federal Constitution and would also violate a confidence
protected under an evidentiary privilege.4° The court held that
the First Amendment of the Federal Constitution guaranteeing
freedom of the press conferred no right on a columnist to refuse
to answer questions concerning the identity of the "network exe-
cutive." The reason given for the above ruling was stated in
terms of necessity to balance both "vital" interests, i.e., free press
and justice, and that in the present case the freedom of the press
"must give place to a paramount public interest in the fair ad-
ministration of justice." 47
Position of the Press
Despite these clear and firm expressions by our courts that,
in the absence of a specific statute, newsmen have no legal au-
thority to keep the sources of their information confidential,
newspapermen apparently intend to defy the law.48 At a Febru-
ary, 1959 convention, the New York State Society of Newspaper
Editors reaffirmed "the traditional principle that the identity of
a news source be held confidential." 49 Also, currently the Amer-
43 123 id. at 480.
44 Ibid. at 480.
45 259 F. 2d 545 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U. S. 910 (1958). District
Court ordered the witness to state the name of her informant. Upon her
refusal to do so, she was held in criminal contempt and ultimately jailed.
46 Id. at pp. 549-50. The court emphasized the duty of a witness to testify
in a court of law and indicated certain limitations to this duty in keeping
with the concept of free press. If the judicial process were used to "force a
wholesale disclosure of a newspaper's confidential sources of news" or if
the "news source (were) of doubtful relevancy and materiality," there
might be an abridgment of the free press.
4T Ibid. at p. 549.
48 New York Times, Feb. 4, 1959, p. 17.
49 Ibid. at p. 17.
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ican Society of Newspaper Editors, the Associated Press Man-
aging Editors, and Sigma Delta Chi, professional journalism
fraternity, joined in efforts to protect freedom of information.50
It is difficult to perceive any lawful means by which any
given individual or group could resist court decisions altogether.
Lawful disobedience of the law is pure nonsense. Therefore,
the present position of the press indirectly challenges the su-
premacy of law, the principle which still signifies the glory of
the American political system. In Plunkett v. Hamilton,"' the
court held that the citizen or inhabitant owes to the state the
duty of testifying, when lawfully called upon to do so, in order
that the truth may be ascertained and impartial and complete
justice done. The court concluded that "A promise not to testify
when so required is substantially a promise not to obey the
law." 52 Perhaps this unified storming of the legislative halls by
the press is a sophisticated attempt to circumvent this proposi-
tion, but it reveals that the behavior of pressure groups is
seldom colored by any genuine concern for the common welfare,
although they often claim to carry the burden of the general
good.53
At this time it is impossible even to volunteer a guess how
far this unified effort will succeed. But already a major victory
has been won by the press in the passage of the Moss-Hennings
Bill,54 ending the use of the 1789 federal "housekeeping" statute
as an excuse to withhold news from governmental agencies. 55
As a result of this extra-curricular activity on the part of the
50 1959 Encyc. Britannica Book of the Year, 490.
51 Plunkett v. Hamilton, 136 Ga. 72, 70 S. E. 781 (1911). One of the ablest
decisions on the journalist's privilege.
52 70 id. at 786.
53 Pressure groups are most conspicuous in their activities in support of
and in opposition to legislative proposals. It is important to note that a
large proportion of legislation originates outside the legislature itself. The
staff members of the pressure groups draft bills for introduction into legisla-
tive body, bills that, of course, reflect the policies of the group. See, Burns,
Congress on Trial (1949); also Lane, Notes on the Theory of the Lobby,
2 Western Political Quarterly, pp. 153-161 (1949).
54 5 U. S. C. 22 #R. C. 161. (Signed by President Eisenhower on Aug. 12,
1958.) Original sec. 161: "The head of each department is authorized to
prescribe regulations, not inconsistent with the law, for the government of
his department, the conduct of its officers and clerks, the distribution and
performance of its business, and the custody, use, and preservation of the
records, papers, and property appertaining to it."
MOSS-HENNINGS BILL: "Sec. 161 of the R. C. is amended with respect
to the authority of Federal officers and agencies to withhold information
and limit the availability of records, by adding at the end thereof the
following sentence: THIS SECTION DOES NOT AUTHORIZE WITH-
HOLDING INFORMATION FROM THE PUBLIC OR LIMITING THE
AVAILABILITY OF RECORDS TO THE PUBLIC." See, Congressional
and Adm. News, 85th Congress 2d Session p. 3354 (1958).
55 1959 Encyc. op. cit. supra note 50.
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press, even the American Bar Association was put on defense of
its Canon 35, barring courtroom photography.5 0
In view of our judicial decisions and a general trend of legal
minds toward narrowing of the field of privileges, is this vigorous
campaign on the part of the press justified? Is a testimonial
privilege necessary to preserve the constitutional freedom of the
press?
It should be noted that "public interest" argument is used to
deny the privilege at Common Law and in the majority of juris-
dictions, and to grant it by statute in the small minority. The
exponents of newspaper confidence laws urge that the privilege
should be granted because it would result in better news report-
ing and, therefore, would benefit the public. Thus, the basic
query is, whether the absence of the privilege causes inferior
news reporting? This argument by confidence exponents is not
very convincing. In fact it is rebutted by practical experience.
No one will disagree that only few daily newspapers can approach
the superiority of the news reporting found in The New York
Times, though the State of New York does not have a confidence
statute. Once the public-benefit argument is removed, the very
foundation for the existence of such privilege disappears. The
only remaining logical reason for the claim of the privilege by
journalists and other pressure groups is an attempt to secure
their business interests behind a legal barrier of secrecy. It has
been suggested that this claim "is motivated not by altruism but
rather by the inescapable fact that the economic survival of the
news-gathering industry depends largely on the preservation of
confidential sources of information." 51 Therefore the public in-
terest in the search for truth should not be subordinated to the
personal interests of a relatively small class.
Today, newspaper industries are highly concentrated busi-
ness enterprises which have a general tendency to follow the
point of view of the dominant economic groups in respective com-
munities. The effect of this concentration of power and money
is the control of centers for the diffusion of ideas, and, ultimately,
for opinion manipulation. s Such conduct on the part of the press,
in effect, amounts to a betrayal of a public trust. It also indicates
the fact that the threat to the freedom of the press lies within
56 Note, Media Groups Join ABA in Canon 35 Study, 5 The Student Law-
yer 30 (1959). The ABA's special Committee to Study Proposed Revision
of Judicial Canon 35--the 21-year-old canon prohibiting photography in
courtrooms-met recently in Washington with representatives of the eight
media organizations to discuss the new ABA plan. Its objective is to throw
"fresh light" on the Canon 35 controversy. A recent Ohio decision permitted
news photography through courtroom-door windows. In re Greenfield, 163
N. E. 2d 910 (Ohio App., decided Feb. 1959, reported Feb. 1960).
57 Note, 36 Va. L. R. 61, 83 (1950).
58 Wells, op. cit. supra note 5. "They [the people] did not realize that a free
press could develop a sort of constitutional venality due to its relations
with advertisers, and that large newspaper proprietors could become buc-
caneers of opinion and insensate wreckers of good beginnings."
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the press itself. An opinion5 9 was voiced on a number of oc-
casions that the dependency of the newspapers upon advertising
for revenue presents a real threat to the free press in the form
of prior economic restraint on publication. Newspaper owners
who are chiefly interested in how space is sold and not how it is
filled are probably responsible for the inferior news reporting
rather than the absence of the privilege statute. President Gray-
son Kirk of Columbia University hinted a conviction that "out-
side of a few great papers the majority of dailies have become
as much amusement carrousels as information vehicles." 60
Whatever the reason, a great part of our newspaper media fails
in its duty to inform and educate the public but instead turns to
a world of make-believe. A number of dailies and journals con-
tain loosely researched stories, with a stress on crime, sex and
society news in order to sell newspapers. Sometimes the press in
fact misinforms the public in creating false images. Recently this
admission was made by a member of the journalistic profession
when he stated:
The truth is in this Golden Age of Communications, when-
ever the press participates massively in history it changes
history, and thereby abdicates its role of reporting the news
in favor of actually making the news.0 1
The recent Khrushchev tour "was but the latest eruption of
this potentially fatal sickness." 12 Such practices hardly comply
with the tenor of the statement issued by President Eisenhower
as a prelude to a week's nationwide celebration of the freedom
of the press. 3
Conclusion
In a democratic society all rights and freedoms are neces-
sarily limited and interdependent. Therefore, in our case, the
existing evidentiary privileges were granted for certain pro-
fessional communications, not as a matter of whim, but in order
to reconcile conflicting interests and policies. They were given
in the belief that the benefits derived therefrom justified the risk
59 White, How Free is Our Press?, 146 The Nation pp. 693-95 (June 18,
1938). "The advertising agencies undertake to protect their clients from
what the clients and agents may regard as real danger from inimical social,
political, or industrial influences. As advisers the advertising agencies may
exercise unbelievably powerful pressure upon newspapers. There is grave
danger that in the coming decade, as social, industrial, and economic prob-
lems become more and more acute, this capacity for organized control of
newspaper opinion by the political advisers of national advertisers may
constitute a major threat to a free press."
60 Sevareid, The Press in a Rose-Colored Mirror, 14 Reporter Mag. 25 (May
17, 1956).
61 Bradlee, Saturation Coverage, 21 Reporter Mag. 32 (Oct. 29, 1959).
62 Ibid. at p. 32.
63 Dwight D. Eisenhower, op. cit. supra note 1.
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that unjust decisions may sometimes result from the suppression
of material and relevant evidence. The journalist's cause for such
a grant is inadequate and the legislative branches of the state
governments should carefully reconsider the factors involved be-
fore extending it. Since the rule of privilege is an obstacle
placed in the path of judicial search for truth, it cannot be ex-
tended too far before a point might be reached at which the
exercise of that right will become inordinately expensive for the
rest of the society. Besides, the judicial tribunals are the zealous
guardians of our rights and freedoms; thus it should be left in
their sound discretion to determine whether a non-disclosure of
a "source" would prevent access to facts necessary for the
correct disposal of the case.
12https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol9/iss2/15
